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STAPLETON v. WESTMORELAND COAL COMPANY:
TOWARD MAKING THE INTERIM PRESUMPTION
IRREBUTTABLE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Coal workers' pneumoconiosis ("CWP"), more popularly referred to as black
lung disease, is an insidious respiratory impairment caused by the inhalation of
coal dust over an extended period of time.' Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 19692 ("Act") was passed by Congress to provide cash
benefits for miners who were totally disabled or had died from coal workers'
pneumoconiosis. Under the Act, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") was
responsible for the administration of all claims (Part B) filed before December
31, 1973, and the Department of Labor ("DOL") for claims (Part C) filed on
or after January 1, 1973.1
Part B and Part C black lung claimants experienced substantial delays in the
processing of their claims by both the SSA and the DOL. Congressional concern
over these delays resulted in the Act being amended in 1972 and 1977 to reduce
eligibility requirements, to mandate the development of interim procedures fa-
cilitating improvement in the claims approval rate, and to reduce the significant
number of backlogged claims. The regulations developed to satisfy these objectives
allow the claimant a rebuttable presumption of total disability once minimal ev-
identiary requirements have been satisfied.
4
Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co.5 is the consolidation for en banc review
of three cases primarily concerned with the common issue of the type and quantum
of proof required for the invocation and rebuttal of the "interim presumption"
provided for under 20 C.F.R. section 727.203.6
With a three-way split and four separate opinions filed, the Stapleton court
held that the interim presumption is properly invoked if a claimant produces a
single piece or set of qualifying medical evidence as delineated in 20 C.F.R. sec-
See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,6 (1976).
2 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, §§ 401-421,
83 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-936 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
3 30 U.S.C. § 901(c). See also id. §§ 921-925 (Part B), and id. §§ 931-945 (Part C).
I Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History Surrounding the Black Lung Interim
Presumption and a Survey of its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 869 (1981).
Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
871 (1987).
6 Id. at 427.
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tions 727.203(a)(1), (2), or (3). In addition, one qualifying physician's opinion
or, absent that, a preponderance of other medical evidence will invoke the interim
presumption under 20 C.F.R. section 727.203(a)(4). 7 This decision overruled the
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Sanat8 holding that all evidence must be weighed
before the interim presumption is invoked and maintained the Sanati holding
regarding the establishment of the presumption under (a)(4) in the absence of a
qualified physician's opinion. 9
The Stapleton court also held that when a presumption established under 20
C.F.R. section 727.203(a) is being rebutted under section (b), all relevant medical
evidence must be considered and weighed, with the exception that a claim denial
cannot be based solely on one negative chest X-ray.' 0 The court also overruled
two past decisions, Whicker v. United States Department of Labor Benefits Re-
view Board" and Hampton v. United States Department of Labor Benefits Review
Board.12 Finally, the court held that interest on a black lung benefits award starts
to accrue thirty days after the first agency decision awarding benefits."
This Comment will review the legislative history of the regulation containing
the interim presumption and significant prior cases interpreting its meaning. It
also will discuss the futility of attempting rebuttal under the plain language of
20 C.F.R. section 727.203(b)(3) as a result of Stapleton.
Id. at 426-27.
1 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Sanati, 713 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1983), overruled, Stapleton, 785
F.2d 424.
9 Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 427. Santi followed the general rule that all evidence must be weighed
before the interim presumption is invoked. See Orange v. Island Creek Coal Co., 786 F.2d 724 (6th
Cir. 1986); see also Back v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 796 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir.
1986) ("As the decisions discussed herein demonstrate, this court has rejected the plurality view of
the Fourth Circuit in Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co."); Alabama By-Products v. Killingsworth,
733 F.2d 1511, 1517 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[M]ine employment for ten years does not alone activate the
presumption; the miner must also show chest X-rays establishing pneumoconiosis."); Kaiser Steel v.
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 748 F.2d 1426, 1430 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[Wie find that
the ALJ's finding that the 'interim presumption' . . . was clearly supported by substantial evidence.");
Evosevich v. Consolidation Coal Co., 789 F.2d 1021, 1023 n.22 (3d Cir. 1986) ("In light of the
conclusion we reached [rejection of petition for review after claim was denied]... we do not address
the propriety of the presumptions here invoked" without the weighing of conflicting evidence.); Pea-
body Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 778 F.2d 358, 361 (7th Cir. 1985)
("Section 727.203(a) directly presimes a miner eligible for benefits under the Act, provided the miner
has worked at least 10 years in a coal mine .. . and can prove qualifying medical values.")
10 Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 427.
" Whicker v. United States Dept. of Labor Benefits Review Bd. 733 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1984).
12 Hampton v. United States Dept. of Labor Benefits Review Bd. 678 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam).
11 Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 434.
[Vol. 89
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CLAIMANTS' CASES
A. Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Company
Stapleton had been employed for at least fifteen years in the coal mines. He
was an employee of Westmoreland Coal Company from 1969 until 1972 when
he quit working at age thirty-five because of heart and respiratory problems.' 4
The evidence considered by the administrative law judge ("AL") in denying
benefits consisted of the following:
(1) A 1973 X-ray noting minimal pneumonitis but otherwise clear lungs;
(2) a 1976 X-ray read by a "B" reader 5 indicating changes in the lungs
consistent with CWP;
(3) a 1980 X-ray read by a "B" reader, finding no evidence of pneumocon-
iosis, and reread by another "B" reader who reached the same conclusion;
(4) a pulmonary function study performed in 1976 showing qualifying values;
(5) a 1980 study reflecting nonqualifying values;
(6) arterial blood gas studies from 1976 and 1980 reflecting nonqualifying
values;
(7) two 1973 medical reports from two different examining physicians each
stating that Stapleton suffered from a heart disorder;
(8) a 1976 medical report from a physician who examined Stapleton at the
request of the DOL finding evidence of pneumoconiosis and possible bronchitis,
but noting that the functional impairment was primarily from a heart condition
and back pain with only slight respiratory impairment;
(9) a 1980 medical report from an examining physician concluding that the
evidence was insufficient to validate a diagnosis of CWP and determining that
the primary impairment was related to a heart condition and cardiac neurosis;
and
(10) a 1980 report from a nonexamining physician concluding that Stapleton
did not suffer from pneumoconiosis or any significant respiratory problem.
The ALJ invoked the interim presumption under 20 C.F.R. section 727.203(a)(1)
on the basis of the 1976 X-ray, but concluded that the presumption was suffi-
"1 Id. 428-29 ("A 'B' reader is a physician who has completed a course and passed a proficiency
examination conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health for reading
pneumoconiosis on x-ray films." Id. n.2).
,s Id. at 429.
19871
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ciently rebutted by the conflicting medical evidence under section 727.203(b)(4).1 6
Upon review of the decision, the Benefits Review Board ("BRB") concluded that
the denial of benefits was correct. However, they determined the ALJ had erred
in invoking the presumption on the basis of a single positive X-ray. 7 The Stapleton
court concluded that the ALJ was correct both in invoking the presumption on
the basis of the 1976 X-ray and finding that the presumption had been sufficiently
rebutted by substantial evidence. 8
B. Ray v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation
Ray had worked as a coal miner for sixteen years before quitting in 1973 at
the age of thirty-four because of stomach problems. The medical evidence con-
sidered by the ALJ in Ray's claim included six ventilatory studies, ten X-rays,
and reports from six physicians.' 9
One of the X-rays, made in 1974, was interpreted as positive; however, the
reader was not identified and the signature was illegible. A 1977 X-ray also was
read as positive for pneumoconiosis, and the most recent X-ray, made in 1980,
was read as showing only a "suspicion" of pneumoconiosis. The other seven X-
rays were interpreted as negative. 20
Pulmonary disability was shown in two of the six physicians' reports, but
these reports were discounted because they failed to positively state that the dis-
ability was due to coal dust exposure. A 1975 physician's report concluded that
the disability was "probably" due to exposure to coal dust, and a 1980 report
concluded that smoking cigarettes had caused the disability. A 1977 report de-
termined total disability in spite of the fact that the arterial blood gas and ven-
tilatory studies performed on the claimant were normal. Ray's treating physician
reported that his pulmonary difficulties were not significant.2' In addition, there
were two ventilatory studies.2
The ALJ found that the negative ventilatory studies outweighed the two earlier
positive ventilatory studies and concluded that the interim presumption had not
been invoked; thus benefits were denied. The BRB affirmed the decision. 23 On
appeal, the Stapleton court concluded that the presumption had been triggered
by either the qualifying ventilatory studies or the opinion of one physician finding
16 Id. at 430.
17 Id. at 427.





2 Id. at 437.
[Vol. 89
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Ray totally disabled from a respiratory impairment. 24 "The five negative or in-
conclusive doctor's opinions should have been considered on rebuttal as should
the negative or nonqualifying test results and X-rays." z Accordingly, Ray's case
was remanded for redetermination of whether "in the light of all relevant evidence
the presumption was rebutted.' '26
C. Mullins Coal Company v. Cornett
Cornett had worked in the coal mines for about thirty-six years, nine of which
were spent as an employee of Mullins Coal Company. In 1977, he suffered a
heart attack and was informed by his family physician that he was suffering from
CWP. Following the heart attack, Cornett attempted to return to the coal mines,
but quit within one year because of shortness of breath and coughing. 27
The medical evidence evaluated by the ALJ in Cornett's claim included both
qualifying and nonqualifying X-rays, arterial blood gas studies, ventilatory func-
tion tests and medical opinions from two physicians, one of which was the family
physician. The ALJ gave greater weight to the qualifying opinion of Cornett's
family physician because there was no indication that the physician who rendered
the nonqualifying opinion had examined Cornett on more than one occasion."
The ALJ determined that the presumption had been invoked under 20 C.F.R.
sections 727.203(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), and had not been sufficiently rebutted.
29
The ALJ then awarded benefits and interest at the rate of six percent per annum
beginning in July 1978, the eligibility date. The BRB affirmed the decision. 0
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the award of benefits to Cor-
nett but limited the award of interest to comence thirty days from the date of
the initial determination of eligibility.
3'
III. Ti DEVELOPMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE 1969 ACT
A. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 196932 was enacted
to compensate miners for the adverse economic impact of coal workers' pneu-
2 Id. at 468 (Widener, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
2 Id.
2 Id. at 430.
27 Id.
21 Id. at 430-31.
2 Id. at 431.
o Id. at 437.
" See supra note 2.
32 Solomons, supra note 4, at 870 n.5.
1987]
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moconiosis. The Act provided for the payment of lifetime benefits to miners who
were totally disabled by CWP as well as to the survivors of those miners who
had died from CWP. 33
The Act required that claims for benefits filed between December 31, 1969,
and December 31, 1972, were to be processed and paid by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare through the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). 4
Claims filed after December 31, 1972 (Part C claims), were to be processed under
the workers' compensation laws of the state in which the miner was employed
if that state's laws had been approved by the DOL.3 1 Otherwise, claims filed after
December 31, 1972, were to be processed by the DOL and paid by the miner's
coal mine employer in accordance with the criteria established by the Secretary
of Labor.16 Under both the 1969 Act and the 1972 amendments, the SSA was
given exclusive authority to develop medical standards and criteria for evaluating
claims. 37
B. The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972
In enacting the 1972 amendments, Congress, apparently concerned with the
backlog of claims, expressly directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare ("HEW") to adopt interim procedures (interim presumption) to permit
expedient processing of its backlogged Part B claims.38
The SSA, in responding to the congressional directive, proposed less stringent
medical criteria than previously followed in processing claims for benefits. The
HEW issued a regulation embodying the use of an interim presumption or interim
standards for processing Part B claims. 39 This interim presumption did not apply
to Part C claims.40
The claimant's burden of establishing total disability or death due to CWP
was substantially reduced with the creation of the interim presumption of total
disability.4' The presumption is easily invoked and "by its terms permits an in-
ference of critical facts which are not, medically speaking, justified by the invoking
evidence." '42 "lIlt is well accepted that a chest radiograph showing early stage




m Id. at 871.
3 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-36 (1976).
38 20 C.F.R. 410.490(a) (1980).
11 Solomons, supra note 4, at 871-73. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 410.490.
See generally 20 C.F.R. § 410.490.
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Yet under the presumption, a totally disabling impairment is presumed from this
evidence alone. ' 43 Because the qualifying pulmonary function values are not grad-
uated for the age of the claimant, they allow the presumption of a totally disabling
pulmonary or respiratory deficiency in an older miner whose pulmonary function
is essentially normal." Using the interim presumption, the SSA claims approval
rate, which was almost fifty percent prior to the adoption of the interim standards,
steadily increased.45
Soon after the Department of Labor began processing claims, it was discov-
ered that the approval rate for Part C claims was substantially lower than the
approval rate for Part B claims.4 6 The interim presumption's inapplicability to
Part C claims was recognized as a significant causative factor.47 However, the
DOL had no independent authority to extend the presumption's application to
Part C claims.
48
C. The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977
Despite the recognition of the disparity in approval rates as early as July
197349 and the DOL's support for the use of the interim presumption, the SSA
refused to extend the application of the presumption to Part C claims. The DOL's
support was based on the belief that Part B and Part C claimants should be
accorded equal treatment rather than any belief in the validity of the interim
presumptions. The DOL "never consulted medical or scientific experts in con-
nection with the matter."
5 0
The SSA argued that the interim presumption was simply an administrative
device developed to expedite claims approval and that use of the permanent reg-
ulations for Part C claims would not prevent a miner disabled by pneumoconiosis
from obtaining benefits. 5' This argument was rejected as pressure from various
groups representing the claimants' positions increased.
52
As a result of the pressure applied by these groups and the DOL's compar-
atively low approval rate, the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 was in-
,3 Id.
- Id. at 871, 884.




41 Id. at 885-86.
10 Id. at 885.
" Id. at 887.
5 H.R. 1532, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 4389, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) cited in
Solomons, supra note 4, at 889.
19871
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troduced during the first session of the 95th Congress. 3 However, by this time,
the DOL had withdrawn its support for the interim presumption.4 It is probable
that the DOL's support was withdrawn because the SSA had "finally made it
clear to the [DOL] that the interim presumption was scientifically [and medically]
invalid."''5 Furthermore, the SSA had applied the interim standards as an "ir-
rebutable" presumption, which allowed the approval of large numbers of marginal
claims with a minimum of effort.- 6 This is supported by a 1980 General Ac-
counting Office report which found that 88.5 percent of all claims reviewed and
approved by SSA contained no evidence of total disability or death as a result
of pneumoconiosis.1 7
The belief that the interim presumption had been applied by the SSA in such
a way as to make it appear irrebuttable concerned both the House and Senate
conferees. To alert the DOL that it was not to follow the SSA's incomplete claims
review procedures, the conference report mandated the consideration of all rel-
evant medical evidence.
5 8
The statute required that the standard developed by the DOL could not be
more restrictive than the interim standards developed by the SSA.59 However, the
SSA presumption was "susceptible to dual interpretation-as written and as ap-
plied." 6 To correct this problem, the conference report also stressed that the
DOL was to develop criteria using the SSA presumption "as written" for a guide. 6'
The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, signed into law on March 1,
1978, was the result of a compromise of the positions advanced by various interest
groups.62 The DOL recommended that the President approve the bill. Its concerns
over the inappropriateness of the interim presumption's use had been reduced by
53 Hearings on the Administration of the Black Lung Program before the Senate Committee on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 193-95 (1977); Black Lung Benefits Provisions of the Federal
Coal Mine Health & Safety Act: Hearings Before the House Committee on Education and Labor,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 241 (1977) (statements of Donald Elisberg), cited in Solomons, supra note 4,
at 889.
, Solomons, supra note 4, at 889.
Id. at 889-90.
56 Id.
17 COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, Legislation Allows Black Lung
Benefits to be Awarded Without Adequate Evidence of Disability (July 28, 1980) cited in Solomons,
supra note 4, at 897 (However, the GAO report declared it to be the result of following the rc-
quirements of the legislation.).
11 H.R. REP. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONa. & AD.
NEws 309-10, noted in Solomons, supra note 4, at 897.
"I Solomons, supra note 4, at 893 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(2) (Supp. 11 1978)).
6 Id.
61 Id.
Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub.- L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978).
[Vol. 89
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the directive that all "relevant evidence be considered." 6 In an effort to comply
with the amendments, the Secretary issued his own version of the interim pre-
sumption.6
D. The Interim Presumption of the Department of Labor
The Labor Department's version of the interim presumption expanded the
scope of qualifying evidence to include arterial blood gas studies65 and other med-
ical evidence, including documented medical opinions establishing total disability
due to respiratory impairment. 6 The expansion was primarily necessitated by the
broadened meaning of pneumoconiosis under the 1977 amendments to include
any respiratory or pulmonary impairment caused by coal mine employment. 67
The Labor Department rebuttal provisions required the adjudicator to con-
sider all relevant medical evidence. While the SSA rebuttal provisions did not
prohibit consideration of all relevant medical evidence, "Congress made it clear
that the [DOL] was not to follow the suspected SSA practice of ignoring [it]....
Like their SSA counterparts, Labor rebuttal clauses 1 and 2 both cross reference
20 C.F.R. § 410.412(a)(1) of the SSA permanent criteria." ' 6 Rebuttal clauses 3
and 4 have no SSA counterpart.
69
Rebuttal is permitted if it is established under rebuttal clause 3 "that the total
disability or death of the miner did not arise in whole or in part out of coal
mine employment" or under rebuttal clause 4 if it is established that the miner
does not have pneumoconiosis. 70 The plain language of rebuttal clause 3 precludes
rebuttal of the presumption ("total disability" due to pneumoconiosis) invoked
under the regulation unless it is established that no part of the total disability,
"however insignificant, is related to coal mine employment." ' 7'
E. Case Law Development of the Interim Presumption
The DOL's administration of claims under its version of the interim pre-
sumption appears to be quite different than the SSA's perfunctory review of Part
' Report on H.R. 4544 from Ray Marshall to James McIntyre, Director, OMB, (Feb. 28, 1986),
cited in Solomons, supra note 4, at 895.
14 See generally 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1980).
1 Id. at § 727.203(a)(3) (1980) cited in Solomons, supra note 4, at 898.
11 Id. at § 727.203(a)(4), cited in Solomons, supra note 4, at 898.
11 United States Steel Corp. v. Gray, 588 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1979); Cf. Solomons, supra note
4, at 898 ("[I]t is not unreasonable to suggest that the expansion was adopted for administrative
convenience .... ).
63 Solomons, supra note 4, at 900.
69 Id.
70 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.203(b)(3)-(4). Id.
"1 Solomons, supra note 4, at 901.
1987]
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B benefit claims.7 2 The development of case law subsequent to the 1978 amend-
ment supports this conclusion. 7
The constitutionality of the SSA presumption was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.74 The Third, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits, relying primarily on Usery, have rejected similar consti-
tutional challenges to the interim presumptions promulgated by the DOL.
71
Several prior cases interpreting the presumption have imposed artificial limits
severely restricting rebuttal. In Hampton v. United States Department of Labor
Benefits Review Board, the Fourth Circuit held that once the interim presumption
is triggered, the miner's failure to satisfy the other tests under 20 C.F.R. section
727.203(a)(1)-(4) does not rebut the interim presumption. 76 In Whicker v. United
States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board, the Fourth Circuit made it
clear that while "[n]onqualifying test results may be part of this [rebuttal inquiry,
... they cannot be used as the principle or exclusive means of rebutting an interim
presumption of pneumoconiosis . . . [under] the applicable regulation." 77
In Whicker, the interim presumption was invoked under 20 C.F.R. section
727.203(a)(1) after the ALJ weighed the negative X-rays against the positive X-
rays and found that the positive X-rays and the attached radiology reports had
established that Whicker had pneumoconiosis. The ALJ denied benefits, however,
because he found that the presumption had been rebutted by the various medical
opinions disputing the cause and severity of the impairment and the nonqualifying
ventilatory function tests and arterial blood gas studies. 7 The Whicker court held
that the ALJ's reliance on the ventilatory function tests and blood gas studies
was impermissible and ordered the award of benefits. 79
Stapleton expressly overrules Whicker. However, in view of the fact that the
Whicker court refused to allow the best method of detecting and evaluating a
coal mine dust related impairment (the blood gas study) to rebut the least effective
(the X-ray), 0 it was probably "bad law" from its conception. Continuing to
7 See Solomons, supra note 4, at 898.
73 Cf. Solomons, supra note 4, at 902 ("While many SSA denials were litigated in the federal
courts there has been very little useful precedent flowing from this litigation.").
74 Usery, 428 U.S. 1.
7, Peabody Coal Co., 778 F.2d 358; Alabama By-Products, 733 F.2d at 1516-18.
76 Hampton, 678 F.2d at 508.
- Whicker, 733 F.2d at 349 (citation omitted).
71 Id. at 348.
' Id.
so "One initial concern expressed by those evaluating the early application of the black
lung benefits provisions was the lack of adequate facilities for conducting blood gas or
exercise tolerance test. Since this is the one best calculated to detect and evaluate a coal
mine dust related impairment the infrequency of its use. . .was particularly disturbing."
Solomons, supra note 4, at 877. Furthermore, Congress believed the backlog of claims could
not wait until sufficient numbers of these testing facilities had been established, and man-
dated that claims be evaluated in light of this reality by the adoption of interim evidentiary
rules and interim disability evaluation criteria. Id. at 878.
[Vol. 89
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adhere to it would be contrary to the relevant evidentiary standards of 20 C.F.R.
section 727.203(b) and Stapleton.81
The plain language of rebuttal clause 3 is clearly in conflict with the Act. 2
In United States Steel Corp. v. Gray,83 the Fifth Circuit ruled that under the
interim standards established by the SSA for adjudicating Part B claims, the
regulations84 required "as a condition of entitlement that pneumoconiosis be the
'primary' cause of disability." s5 Rebuttal of total disability due to pneumoconiosis
under the plain language of (b)(3) is allowed when "[t]he evidence established
that the total disability did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine em-
ployment.' '86
The validity of rebuttal clause 3 was successfully challenged in Jones v. New
River Co.87 as being inconsistent with 30 U.S.C. section 901, which requires the
payment of benefits only when the claimant is totally disabled and pneumoconiosis
is the primary reason. The criteria adopted by SSA for determining total disability
under the statute support the Jones analysis.88
Beginning with Carozza v. United States Steel Corp.,8 9 the Jones analysis of
rebuttal clause 3 has been widely rejected.9 The Carozza court primarily relied
on the presumption contained in 30 U.S.C. section 921(c)(4) to support its ruling. 91
This presumption allows rebuttal of the presumption of a totally disabling res-
piratory or pulmonary impairment of a miner with fifteen years of coal mine
employment invoked by evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary
impairment. Under this presumption, it must be established that the miner does
not have pneumoconiosis or that the respiratory or pulmonary impairment did
not arise from employment in the coal mine. 92 The statute on which the Carozza
court relied, as well as the legislative history of the Act, simply does not support
such a broad interpretation. The Carozza ruling, however, is consistent with the
plain language of the regulation.
11 See Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 466 (widener, J., concurring in part, dissenting, in part).
2 Solomons, supra note 4, at 901.
11 United States Steel Corp. 588 F.2d 1022 (1979); see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Benefits Review
Bd., 560 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1977).
- 20 C.F.R. § 410.426(a).
United States Steel Corp., 588 F.2d at 1027.
20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3).
Jones v. New River Co., 3 Black Lung Rep. (M.B.) 1-199 (June 10, 1981); see also Van Nest
Consolidation Coal Co., 3 Black Lung Rep. (M.B.) 1-526 (June 11, 1981).
See 20 C.F.R. § 410.426.
9 Carozza v. United States Steel Corp., 727 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1984).
0 Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1984); Alabama By-Products,
733 F.2d at 1516 n.10; Gibas v. Saginaw Mining Co., 748 F.2d 1112, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985); American Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 738 F.2d 387, 391 (10th
Cir. 1984).
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The Carozza court and its followers generally have held that when a miner
has worked in coal mines fifteen years or more and simple pneumoconiosis is
present, rebuttal clause 3 is not satisfied even though the primary cause of the
claimant's total disability (e.g., heart disease) is unrelated to the claimant's coal
mine employment. 93
The legislative history indicates that some of the Act's promoters would like
to have made the black lung program a government sponsored pension program. 94
However, the entire legislative history sufficiently reflects that Congress never
intended the program to be operated in such a manner. 95 The original and amended
Act was designed to compensate claimants for total respiratory or pulmonary
disability related to coal mine employment. If heart disease is the primary cause
of the total disability, compensation under the Act is not allowed on the basis
of the mere presence of pneumoconiosis.
Contrary to the purpose of the Act, a court following both Stapleton and
Carozza would permit the presumption of total disability from pneumoconiosis
to be invoked (as defined by the 1977 amendments) on the basis of a single X-
ray, blood gas study, ventilatory study, or physician's opinion, and limit rebuttal
to proof that the claimant is capable of working in the mines, is actually working
in the mines, or has no pneumoconiosis.
In Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co.,96 the Third Circuit appeared to have
backed away from its holding in Carozza when it failed to reverse the BRB and
award benefits. In Kertesz, the claimant had worked more than twenty-two years
in the coal mines and, like the claimant in Carozza, had pneumoconiosis and was
diagnosed as totally disabled by heart disease. 97 However, the abandonment of
Carozza was short lived, as the Third Circuit soon returned to its Carozza ruling
in Bernardo v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation.98
In Sharpless v. Califano" and Petry v. Califano,100 the Fourth Circuit held
that the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence all of the
facts necessary to invoke the presumption. The Stapleton court has by implication
overruled both Sharpless and Petry and expressly overruled Sanati, which held
that the interim presumption could not be invoked under 20 C.F.R. section
91 Id. (primary disability-heart disease); Alabama By-Products, 733 F.2d at 1513 (primary dis-
ability-arterial hypertension); Gibas, 748 F.2d at 1114 (primary disability-heart disease).
91 Solomons, supra note 4, at 915.
9, See generally Id.
91 Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 160.
Bernardo v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 790 F.2d 351, 353 (3d Cir. 1986).
99 Sharpless v. Califano, 585 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1978) (applying 20 C.F.R. § 410.490).
- Petry v. Califano, 860 577 F.2d (4th Cir. 1978) (applying 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b)).
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727.203(a)(4) without weighing the qualifying physician's opinion against any other
nonqualifying physician's opinion(s).10'
The Stapleton court has rejected the widely followed evidentiary weighing
requirement'0 2 in holding that under the plain language of the regulation,103 the
claimant can trigger the interim presumption of total disability due to pneu-
moconiosis with a single qualifying X-ray, a single set of qualifying ventilatory
or blood gas studies, or the documented opinion of one physician and in holding
that the weighing of other evidence is inappropriate until after the presumption
has been invoked.' °4
IV. THE HoLDINGs AND T=E SUPPORTING JUDGES
The Stapleton decision is confusing because the controlling opinion has not
been crystallized. The court's holdings are presented in a piecemeal fashion
throughout the four opinions of the court. The following summary is provided
for clarity:
(1) The interim presumption under section 727.203(a)(1), (2), or (3) is invoked
when there is credible evidence, obtained in accordance with the applicable reg-
ulatory standards, that a single qualifying X-ray, a single set of qualifying ven-
tilatory studies, or a single set of qualifying blood gas studies indicates the presence
of pneumoconiosis or chronic repiratory or pulmonary disease. This overrules
Sanati'01 insofar as it holds that one qualifying opinion from a physician does
not invoke the presumption under section 727.203(a)(4).
(2) The interim presumption under section 727.203(a)(4) is invoked by one
qualifying physician's opinion which complies with the regulatory requirements.
(3) Stapleton affirms Sanati'6 insofar as it holds that, absent a qualifying
physician's opinion, the interim presumption is invoked under section 727.203(a)(4)
by a preponderance of medical evidence other than X-rays, ventilatory studies,
and blood gas studies weighed under the customary rules of evidence.
(4) Under 20 C.F.R. section 727.203(b), rebuttal of a presumption invoked
under section 727.203(a) requires that all medical evidence, including nonquali-
fying X-rays, test results, and medical opinions, must be considered regardless of
which section under (a) was originally used to invoke the presumption. This hold-
1o1 Santi, 713 F.2d at 482.
1*1 See Evosevich, 789 F.2d 1021; Alabama By-Products, 733 F.2d 1511; Peabody Coal Co., 778
F.2d 358; Engle v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 792 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1986); Orange,
786 F.2d 724, Back, 796 F.2d 169 (expressly rejecting the Stapleton holding).
103 20 C.F.R. § 727.203.
104 Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 434-35.
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ing is limited only by 30 U.S.C. section 923(b), which prohibits the denial of a
claim solely on the basis of one negative X-ray.
(5) Stapleton overrules Whicker"3° and Hampton108
(6) The Stapleton court unamimously holds that interest shall begin to accrue
on the award of black lung benefits thirty days after the first agency decision
finding disability.
V. TBE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The conflicting opinions of both Judge Phillips and Judge Sprouse begin with
a discussion of the judicial deference to be given to the DOL's interpretation of
section 203 of its regulation. Both Judges agree on the general rule that deference
is required unless the agency's interpretation is plainly erroneous, inconsistent with
the regulation, or in excess of the authority delegated to the agency by Congress.° 9
However, they do not agree as to when the deference rule applies." 0
The majority of the court holds that the deference rule applies to the agency's
interpretation of the presumption at the time it published the regulation. Judge
Phillips disagrees and would apply the rule to the interpretation advanced in the
agency's appellate petition."'
Judge Sprouse finds support for the court's position in the Administrative
Procedure Act. "Section 552(a) provides that an agency interpretation of general
application shall not be binding unless it is published in the Federal Register.""
2
Judge Sprouse argues that giving deference to the interpretation advanced by the
DOL as an appellant "is an ill-conceived application of the 'deference rule '.."
because it would "permit any agency in such a posture effectively to resolve
appeals by its own action.""
4
Judge Phillips agrees that agency interpretations advanced by litigants may
be the least worthy of judicial deference, but finds no reason to conclude that
107 Whicker, 733 F.2d at 346.
"I Hampton, 678 F.2d 506.
109 Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 440 (Phillips, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 449 (Sprouse,
J., concurring) (citing United States v. Larioniff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977); and Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 415 (1945).
1 Id.at 440, 449.
"I Id. at 440.
112 Section 552(a) also provides that:
A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction
that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used or cited as precedent by an
agency against a party other than the agency only if [it has been indexed and published
or a party has actual and timely notice of its terms.] Id. at 450-51.
3 Id. at 449.
11 Id. at 451.
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the position advanced by the DOL in its petition "is not the agency's general
position, nor that it is not 'consistently applied' by the agency in its base line
administration of the regulation.""' In fact, the case law preceeding Stapleton
indicates that the BRB, appointed by the Secretary of Labor and relying heavily
on the DOL for its daily operations," 6 and the-courts consistently have applied
the weighing principle to the invocation of the presumption.1 7 As Judge Phillips
notes, the primary and most critical purpose underlying the deference principle
is to encourage uniform application of an agency's regulation." 8
An unfortunate consequence of failure to adhere to the deference principle,
as Judge Phillips also states, "is the inevitable divergence of views and applications
that will emerge in judicial interpretations from circuit to circuit."" 9 Judge Phil-
lips' concern for the confusion that will be created by the failure of the court
to adhere to the deference principle is well founded. The Sixth Circuit has already
rejected the Stapleton decision, 20 and the Third Circuit refused to address the
issue.
121
Judge Phillips' deference argument would be highly persuasive absent a clear
indication of congressional preference for the interpretation advanced by the ma-
jority,'2 and the Labor Secretary's acknowledgment of the preference.'2 Judge
Phillips' interpretation of the mechanics of invoking the presumption and Judge
Sprouse's insistence on affirming the restrictions on rebuttal found in Whicker
and Hampton are contrary to legislative history and the statute. The majority
position constructed by Judge Widener from the opinions of Judges Sprouse,
Hall, and Phillips is consistent with both.
The presumption is merely a device allowing claims to be processed without
the time consuming delays that result from the perceived deficiency of adequate
I's Id. at 440 n.l.
"' Ramsey & Habermann, The Federal Black Lung Program-The View From the Top, 87 W.
VA. L. Ray. 575, 590-91 (1985).
"7 See supra note 10.
" Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 440 n.2.
Id.
' Back, 796 F.2d at 172.
Evosevich, 789 F.2d at 1023, n.2 ("In light of the conclusion we reach [rejection of petition
for review after claim was denied] . . .we do not address the propriety of the presumptions here in-
voked" without the weighing of conflicting evidence.).
,n Stapleton, 785 F.2d at 451-52 n.5.
M Id. 465 (Widener, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part):
[T]he Department cannot as has been requested by some, look for the single item of evidence
which would qualify a claimant on the basis of the interim presumption, and ignore other
previously obtained evidence. This does not mean that the single item of evidence which
establishes the presumption is overcome by a single item of evidence which rebuts the pre-
sumption.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Notice of Final Rulemaking under the Black Lung Benefits
Reform Act of 1977, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,826 (1978)).
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testing facilities.'2 It permits an inference of critical facts which are not justified
from a medical standpoint by the invoking evidence.12 The invalidity of the pre-
sumptions from a medical standpoint mandates that all relevant medical evidence
must be considered in accordance with the statutory directive. 26 As Judge Widener
states:
I am of the opinion that the [statute], which for rebuttal, is untrammeled by any
restrictive interpretation or regulation and provides that "[iln determining the
validity of claims under this part, all relevant evidence shall be considered . .. "
requires consideration of all of the relevant evidence on rebuttal in determining
the ultimate issue. The statutory language is so construed in subsection (b) re-
quiring consideration on rebuttal of "all relevant medical evidence." "A more
comprehensive word than 'all' cannot be found in the English language.. . ," and
no reason is presented to give the word other than its ordinary meaning. I see
no reason to impose artificial restrictions, as Whicker and Hampton have done,
on the evidence available in finally deciding a claim.'
Both Judges Hall and Sprouse acknowledge this requirement, yet their con-
tinued reliance on Whicker, Hampton, and other cases of that genre would make
the rebuttable process an exercise in futility. Judge Widener's all inclusive con-
sideration of the relevant medical evidence in the rebuttal phase would not be
allowed under Judge Hall's analysis. Judges Hall and Sprouse would continue to
adhere to the court's holding in Whicker2 1 that "[o]nce the presumption arises,
the miner's failure to satisfy the remaining tests does not rebut it."129 In other
words, once the interim presumption has been properly invoked under any one
of the criteria specified under section 727.203(a), nonqualifying test results of a
different type than those used to invoke the presumption cannot be used as the
exclusive or principle means to rebut the presumption.
Using the analysis offered by Judges Hall and Sprouse, the claimant could
trigger the presumption with a single X-ray, without being required to rebut any
evidence that was not used to invoke the presumption. The statutory directive
that claims for benefits under the Act shall not be denied solely on the basis of
a chest X-ray 3° would then make rebuttal extremely difficult, if not impossible.
What would be the point in considering the other tests if the claimant is not
required to satisfy them? Judge Widener's majority opinion is a combination of
the best of each of the opinions offered by Judges Phillips, Sprouse, and Hall.
17A Solomons, supra note 4, at 877.
Id. at 882-83.
' 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
Stapleton 785 F.2d at 466-67 (citation omitted).
' Whicker, 733 F.2d 346.
'1 Id. at 348 (quoting Hampton, 678 F.2d at 508).
" 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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In view of the court's unanimous decision on the individual claims of Sta-
pleton and Cornett and the decision to remand Ray's claim because of the pro-
cedural defect perceived by the majority in the AL's failure to invoke the
presumption, the net impact of the court's holdings on future claims is not ap-
parent. There is hope, however, in the majority's directive that all relevant evi-
dence must be considered in the rebuttal process without restriction.
The primary problem facing the mine operator as a result of Stapleton is the
manner in which the opinion is presented. In view of the fact that a single con-
trolling opinion has not been presented, conflicting interpretations are the likely
result. The triggering of the presumption should not add additional burdens to
the defense if, as the court directs, all relevant evidence is considered without
the imposition of "artificial restrictions." However, the court has not gone far
enough in "overruling" those prior cases that have placed "artificial restrictions"
on rebuttal.
In light of Carozza and other cases of its class, a more restrictive burden
has been placed on the mine operator by Stapleton in attempting to rebut the
interim presumption under section 727.203(b)(3). As discussed in this Comment,
the plain language of rebuttal clause (3) clearly conflicts with congressional intent
because it allows a claimant totally disabled by a condition unrelated to pneu-
moconiosis (e.g., heart disease) to receive benefits by a mere showing of simple
pneumoconiosis.
At this time, the Stapleton decision is before the United States Supreme Court.
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